Abstract-We consider the class of secret sharing schemes where there is no a priori bound on the number of players but where each of the share-spaces has fixed cardinality . We show two fundamental lower bounds on the threshold gap of such schemes. The threshold gap is defined as , where is minimal and is maximal such that the following holds: for a secret with arbitrary a priori distribution, each -subset of players can reconstruct this secret from their joint shares without error ( -reconstruction) and the information gain about the secret is nil for each -subset of players jointly ( -privacy). Our first bound, which is completely general, implies that if , then independently of the cardinality of the secret-space. Our second bound pertains to -linear schemes with secret-space ( ). It improves the first bound when is large enough. Concretely, it implies that , for some function that is strictly positive when is large enough. Moreover, also in the -linear case, bounds on the threshold gap independent of or are obtained by additionally employing a dualization argument. As an application of our results, we answer an open question about the asymptotics of arithmetic secret sharing schemes and prove that the asymptotic optimal corruption tolerance rate is strictly smaller than 1.
For a given scheme, let denote average share-length (in bits), i.e., the average Shannon-entropy of the shares. Our first lower bound states that, if , then independently of the cardinality of the secret-space (i.e., the set in which the secret can be selected arbitrarily). It follows at once that, in particular,
We stress that this result is completely general and is not restricted to, say, linear, ideal, threshold, or even perfect schemes.
Our proof for the case is based on a collision-entropy argument. The key element of this argument is a generalization of the proof idea behind the Norse Bound on covering radius from coding theory [25] . The general case is then proved from the result for by induction, which is enabled by shortening, i.e., the process of collapsing to a convenient subscheme by conditioning on a certain event followed by the removal of some players. In the -linear case the dependency on can be removed using a dualization technique. If , this leads to the lower bound Hence, the threshold gap is if is fixed. Our second lower bound involves the cardinality of the secret-space. We first show that if there exists an -reconstructing, -private secret sharing scheme whose secret-space has cardinality , then there exists an -ary error correcting code where . As an immediate consequence, restrictions on the parameters are obtained from known bounds on (linear) error correcting codes, such as Singleton, Plotkin, Hamming, etc. However, a particularly nice result is obtained from a suitable application of the Griesmer bound. This leads to a simple bound that is easy to compare with our first bound. This bound is only valid for -linear schemes, however. Concretely, for -linear schemes with secret-space ( ), we show that or, equivalently,
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We note that the argumentation underlying our second bound does not give a nontrivial result for (in fact, it leads to the triviality ). Thus, for only our first bound gives a nontrivial result. Again, we can remove the dependency on using a dualization technique, thereby obtaining where This improves our first bound when the size of the secret is large enough, i.e., when
As an application of our first bound, we answer an open question about certain arithmetic secret sharing schemes (see Section V for the definition). An -arithmetic secret sharing scheme for over is an -linear secret sharing scheme where the secret is selected from and each of the shares is an element of . Moreover, there is -privacy and, for any set of players, the product of two shared secrets can be reconstructed by applying some linear function to the vector consisting of the products of the two shares held by each player in the set. Such schemes have become a fundamental primitive in cryptographic protocol theory. Quite surprisingly, especially those with good asymptotic properties have recently been shown to be of great importance in the design of two-party secure protocols (see the references in [9] ). It is known by algebraic geometric arguments [8] - [10] that if is fixed, then there are infinite families of such schemes with unbounded and (as well as important variations) such that the quantity tends asymptotically to a positive constant, which is the salient property. It is a very interesting open problem whether there exists a proof for these facts that avoids the use of advanced results from algebraic geometry, in particular, the existence of certain good infinite towers of algebraic function fields. See the references for explicit lower bounds. On the other hand, in the nonasymptotic case, this rate can be equal to 1 by taking suitable instantiations of Shamir's scheme. It was stated as one of the open theoretical problems in [8] to decide whether asymptotically this rate has to be strictly smaller than 1 (as a further price to be paid for "good asymptotics," besides the apparent necessity of algebraic-geometric machinery). We settle this open problem in the affirmative. Namely, we show that, for fixed, for some and for all large enough . More precisely, if we let denote the best possible achievable asymptotic rate, then we show that for all finite fields . We prove this result by a combination of our first threshold gap bound for linear schemes, basic properties of arithmetic secret sharing (specifically, the relationship between privacy in the scheme and reconstruction in its "square" on the one hand, and reconstruction in the scheme on the other hand), and, once again, shortening. It is interesting to note that the upper-and lower bounds on are quite far apart still.
A. Related Work
After completing an earlier version of this paper, an unpublished result by Kilian and Nisan [20] about threshold secret sharing was brought to our attention [3] . In essence, they showed that, if , and if the secret-space has at least cardinality 2, at least one of the share-spaces has cardinality or larger (independently of whether the scheme is linear or not). As it turned out, this result is in fact mentioned, albeit without proof, in the literature, e.g., [1, Beimel' s Ph.D. dissertation] (as well as in at least one other paper including the same author, [2] ).
Although their bound does not imply any lower bounds on the threshold gap (indeed, it assumes to begin with), it is relevant to our results. Their bound follows as a special case of our first bound if one substitutes and interprets it as an upper bound for the average entropy of the shares. As a consequence of their bound, if is an arbitrary constant with then there is a constant such that for any threshold scheme with , it must hold that i.e., the shares are at least of logarithmic size. We incorporate the bound of Kilian and Nisan (Theorem 3.2 below) and, for the first time, its (original) proof with their kind permission. This will at the same time serve as a conceptual introduction to our first lower bound on the threshold gap, whose proof idea turned out to bear some similarities to theirs (yet it has to deal with a much more general scenario). Karnin et al. had previously proved a weaker result in [19] . Namely, they considered threshold secret sharing schemes as above where, in addition, the cardinality of every share space is at most the cardinality of the secret space. They proved that in that case all these cardinalities must coincide and, through a connection with maximum distance separable (MDS) codes, that these cardinalities are at least . We now consider general (i.e., not necessarily threshold) secret sharing schemes. There is a vast literature concerning restrictions on their parameters. We highlight here the results that are more directly related to our work. Let be the cardinality of the secret space and suppose every share belongs to an alphabet of cardinality . Results from Blundo et al. [6] , Jackson and Martin [16] , and Ogata and Kurosawa [23] imply that for general secret sharing schemes. In the context of exposure resilient cryptography, Dodis et al. [14, Th. 1] proved the bound for general secret sharing schemes. We remark that the bounds we have just mentioned involve the size of the secret and become trivial when in particular . Hence, our bounds in Section III distinguish themselves in that they do not depend on , and therefore establish a limitation on some of the parameters even when is small. We can however establish a comparison between our result in Theorem 3.25 (where we prove that for linear schemes with we have ) and the bound from [14] . We see that our bound is strictly stronger as long as is small and in the worst case it can be one unit smaller when is large. On the other hand, our bounds in Section IV do involve the cardinality of the secret space. It becomes clear that combining our Theorem 4.1 and the Singleton bound we obtain the result implied by [6] , [16] , [23] . But other code theoretic bounds yield different (stronger) results (although we should remark that our Corollary 4.3 and the subsequent results in that section are only valid for linear schemes, because they use the Griesmer bound). To the best of our knowledge, such results had not been noticed before.
We can also see our results as lower bounds for the size of shares of a scheme with a fix threshold gap. In the equivalent context of monotone span programs, Karchmer and Wigderson [18] considered threshold linear secret sharing schemes and proved that the total number of field elements given as shares must be . In [8] , this was also proved to hold if the gap is . Our results from Section III-B extend this to the case where the gap is . In this paper, we use different connections between secret sharing and error correcting codes. In Section III-B, we see a linear secret sharing scheme with shares in and secret in as a linear code over , where every codeword consists of a secret (as its first coordinates) and a sharing for it (as its last coordinates). This connection was first pointed out by McEliece and Sarwate [22] in the case of Shamir's secret sharing schemes (which can be seen as Reed-Solomon codes in this way). In the case , it is known that ideal linear threshold secret sharing schemes are equivalent to linear MDS codes via this connection (see [5] , [19] ). Massey [21] gave, also in the case , a characterization of the access structure of a linear secret sharing scheme in terms of the supports of codewords in the dual of the associated linear code. This implies that a linear code with minimum distance and whose dual code has minimum distance leads to a linear secret sharing scheme with and . See [11] , where in addition a more general result for is proved. However, these inequalities do not help us to prove lower bounds for the threshold gap because they are in the "wrong direction." Instead, we exploit the fact that both a code and its dual give rise to linear secret sharing schemes to which we can apply the general bounds in Section III-A and that we can find relations between the access and adversary structures of both schemes, using implicitly Massey's characterization. In Section IV, we use a different connection between secret sharing schemes and error correcting codes. In this case, the error correcting code contains only one vector per secret and the words consist only of the shares held by a set of players. The resulting code has length , dimension , and minimum distance at least . We then use well-known bounds from code theory, such as the Griesmer bound [15] , in order to prove our results. We are not aware of this particular connection being used before.
Finally, with regard to the tightness of our bounds, after we first circulated a preprint of this paper Paterson and Stinson [24] showed that our main bound is tight, as it can be matched in examples where and where by families of secret sharing schemes with unbounded .
B. Outline of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give general definitions about (not necessarily linear or ideal) secret sharing schemes, including the notion of threshold gap. In Section III, we state our first lower bound on the threshold gap of an arbitrary secret sharing scheme. In order to do this we first prove a weaker result, where the shares are all uniformly distributed on alphabets of the same size, then we prove the more general result and finally, we state in Section III-B our improved bound in the case of linear secret sharing schemes. In this section, we also include the result by Kilian and Nisan about threshold secret sharing schemes, which is a special case of our bound. In Section IV, we state our second lower bound, which incorporates the size of the secret and is better than the bound in Section III when the secret is large. Finally, in Section V we recall the concept of arithmetic secret sharing scheme, we apply our bounds on the threshold gap from the previous sections in order to bound the parameters of such schemes, and we prove the aforementioned upper bounds on .
II. PRELIMINARIES OF SECRET SHARING
In this section, we first introduce some notation that will be useful for our purposes and then we define the notion of secret sharing scheme, first introduced in [4] and [26] .
A. Vectors of Random Variables Definition 2.1 (Vector of Random Variables): A vector of random variables is a vector
such that the index-set is finite and nonempty and the 's are random variables defined on the same finite probability space.
Moreover, for each , is the finite alphabet where takes its values. 1 If is a vector of random variables, denotes the index-set.
Note that can be seen as the random variable with alphabet whose probability distribution is the joint distribution of . 
B. Formal Definition and Some Basic Properties of Secret Sharing Definition 2.7 (Secret Sharing):
A secret sharing scheme on players is a vector of random variables with index-set , , and such that we have 1) (Uniformity of the secret). 2 The secret-space satisfies and i.e., there is a priori uncertainty about the secret and it has the uniform distribution on . 2) (Joint reconstruction). Define , the player set, and , the shares. Then, i.e., the shares jointly determine the secret with probability 1. We denote the cardinality of by , or when is clear from the context.
Definition 2.8:
The average length of the shares is . Whenever is clear from the context, we will use . Note that the definition allows the secret and individual shares to be in different sets, not even necessarily of the same cardinality.
Definition 2.9 (Reconstruction and Privacy Sets):
Let be a secret sharing scheme with player set . Let with . Then is a reconstructing set if i.e., the shares of the set jointly determine the secret with probability 1.
On the other hand, is a privacy set if i.e., the a posteriori uncertainty about the secret when given the shares for , equals the a priori uncertainty about the secret (or equivalently, and are independent). By definition, is a privacy set.
By information theory, if and only if , are independent. Therefore, an equivalent definition of a nonempty privacy set is that, for all , the random variable , i.e., conditioned on the event , has the same probability distribution as the random variable . is said to have -privacy if each subset of of cardinality at most is an element of . The privacy threshold is the largest such that has -privacy, denoted by . As before, 0-privacy means by convention that "the empty set gives no information about the secret." Since there certainly is a secret about which there is positive a priori uncertainty, this makes sense. Furthermore, does not necessarily mean that there are no privacy sets; it just means that there is an such that is not a privacy set. But the definition of secret sharing above certainly allows the "cryptographically noninteresting" case that there is no nonempty privacy set at all. However, it is useful, for technical reasons in proofs, to allow this case. Similarly, it is useful to allow . Note that for all integers with there is -privacy. Suppose is a privacy set. Then, by definition, and are independent. Also by definition, the secret is uniformly randomly distributed on the secret-space , which satisfies . Therefore, is not a reconstructing set. Hence, there is the following lemma.
Lemma 2.14: . In particular, . For the sake of notation, we will write , , instead of , , if is clear from the context. The following straightforward lemma is often useful when proving privacy.
Lemma 2.15: Let with . If the distribution of is the uniform distribution on , then is a privacy set.
Proof: Defining the uniform distribution on the Cartesian product of two given finite, nonempty sets is the same as defining the uniform distribution on and, independently, the uniform distribution on . Indeed, for all , the following holds. First, by assumption. Second, and Therefore, Now take and . From the condition in the statement of the lemma it now follows that , are independent.
We now introduce the notion of "shortening" a secret sharing scheme which will be useful for us throughout this paper. 3 Definition 
Proof:
We first prove that is a secret sharing scheme, verifying the two conditions in Definition 2.7. a) First, note that . Since , and are independently distributed. Therefore, has the same distribution as which, since is a secret sharing scheme, is the uniform distribution on . b) Second, we need to prove that the value of determines the value of . For any with , we have . Since is a secret sharing scheme, the value of completely determines the value of , so there exists a unique with . But this implies that . We have proved that determines . We can now generalize these two observations. Let and suppose that and consequently and are independently distributed. Then, it is again straightforward that is uniformly distributed from . This proves the claim over and follows directly. On the other hand, let be a subset of such that . Then, the value of determines the value of . By a similar argument as we used in part b) of the proof that is a secret sharing scheme this means determines . This proves the claim about and consequently that . Finally, we prove the claim about and . Assume that for all , and that 3 This shortening notion has been used before in [17] .
for all . Suppose this is the case. Then, Here, we have used in the first inequality that the average of the multiset is larger or equal than the average of the multiset because all the elements that we remove from the first multiset to obtain the second were larger than the elements that remain in it, by the first of the assumptions. On the other hand, in the third inequality, we use that the expectation of the random variable that samples according to and outputs is larger or equal than its minimum value, which is attained when by the second of the assumptions.
One of the main parameters of interest in this paper is the threshold gap.
Definition 2.18 (Threshold Gap):
The threshold gap of is . is a threshold secret sharing scheme if .
III. BOUND INDEPENDENT OF THE SIZE OF THE SECRET

A. General Bound
In this section, we prove lower bounds for the threshold gap of a secret sharing scheme in terms of the number and average encoding length of the shares. In particular, our bound does not depend on the size of the secret. More precisely, we will prove the following theorem:
Main Theorem 3.1: Let be a secret sharing scheme with . Then,
In particular, where is the average cardinality of the share-spaces.
For Claim 2: There exists a secret sharing scheme with , and and where the cardinalities of all share spaces are .
In order to construct such , we select with and a "possible sharing vector" for the set i.e., an element with . We consider the shortened secret sharing scheme , as defined in Definition 2.16. By Lemma 2.17 and . So Claim 2 is proved. 4 The presentation is copied from our lectures at the Chinese Academy of Sciences and at Institute of Advanced Study, Tsinghua University, May 2012. 5 This can also be readily seen by noticing and using Jensen's inequality, since squaring is a convex function.
Finally, where is as in Claim 2, and the second inequality comes from applying Claim 1 with . We now turn back to proving our Main Theorem 3.1. As it happened with Theorem 3.3, we will start by proving the case and then we will prove the case of a general threshold scheme by constructing another scheme with as above. First, we need some definitions and simple observations. Definition 3.4: Let be a secret sharing scheme. where in addition we have used in the first inequality that (Lemma 2.17), and in the third that because of the last part of Lemma 2.17 and our selection of and .
As a consequence we can state the following. Corollary 3.11: Let be a family of threshold ( ) secret sharing schemes on players, where is unbounded, and suppose there is a constant such that for all . Then, the average size of the shares is at least logarithmic in , i.e., .
B. Improvement for Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
In the main result of this section, Main Theorem 3.26, we prove a lower bound for the threshold gap of a linear secret sharing scheme which, as opposed to what happened with Main Theorem 3.1, does not depend on the privacy threshold.
We define now the concept of linear secret sharing scheme and some related notions and properties, including the definition of dual secret sharing scheme and the relationship between the thresholds of a scheme and those of its dual, which will play an important role in the proof of our main result.
Definition 3.12: Let be a finite field. A linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) over is a secret sharing scheme where the secret and share spaces are -vector spaces and has the uniform distribution on a -linear subspace . Without loss of generalization, we may consider that all spaces are of the form for some . For simplicity, we will consider in most of this section the case where for all , i.e., every share consists of one element of the finite field. The secret will consist of elements of . Note that the random variable has the uniform distribution over a linear code over of length . On the other hand, a linear code over together with a specification of the coordinates that will constitute the secrets and shares gives rise to a linear secret sharing scheme. Massey [21] observed, in the case , that the access structure of the resulting linear secret sharing scheme can be characterized in terms of the supports of the codewords in the dual code.
Our definition of secret sharing scheme is slightly more restricted than the one considered by Massey (we exact reconstruction by the full set of players) and this suggests the notion of -code, which appeared in [9] . We define this notion below, after introducing some notation. Given an -code for over , we define its dual as the set Note that . It is easy to see that if is an -code for over then so is . Hence, we can define the dual secret sharing scheme . Furthermore, we can give a relation between the access and adversary structure of and . For , this relation could be directly deduced from the characterization of the access structure given by Massey [21, Sec. 3] in terms of supports of words in the dual, together with the characterization of the access and adversary structure from Corollary 3.21. In fact, it was already proved in [11 . By Proposition 3.20, there exists an such that there is no word in with , . In other words, the vector is not in the vector space . Therefore, there is a vector which is orthogonal to but not to , i.e.,
Inequality (2) tells us not only that is nonzero, but since , the only possibility is that . We now construct the vector by and . Now for every , we can split into the sum of and . But the first term equals which is zero by (1), while the second one is also zero because . Therefore, is a word in and it also satisfies that , but (because ). By definition, . Finally, since , we also have and the statements about the reconstruction and privacy thresholds can be deduced from here. We can state now a lower bound for the threshold gap of linear secret sharing schemes which does not depend, as it happened with the general bound in Main Theorem 3.1, on the value of the privacy threshold. The idea is to apply Main Theorem 3.1 to both the LSSS and the dual LSSS . We remark that the bound in Main Theorem 3.26 does not depend at all on the size of the secret. Here we only assume that all shares are single elements of .
Theorem 3.25: Let be a linear secret sharing scheme over with all shares in , and . Then,
Proof:
Let for a linear code over of length . We will apply Main Theorem 3.1 to both and (note that by Theorem 3.24 and the assumption on ,
we have , so we can indeed apply the theorem to such that , and define . This is indeed a LSSS (the additive LSSS over for players) such that and , so . We state now, without proving it, the generalization of the Main Theorem 3.26 to the case where players may hold more than one element of the field as share.
Theorem 3.29: Let be a linear secret sharing scheme over where for each the th share is in for some . Let and . Let . Then,
In [18] , Karchmer and Wigderson proved, in the equivalent language of monotone span programs, that the total number of field elements given as shares in a binary linear secret sharing scheme (which they call dimension of the span program) with a threshold access structure where must be . See also [13] . In [8, Th. 13], this was generalized to linear secret sharing schemes with threshold gap . Theorem 3.29 above improves the latter result, and therefore further generalizes the previous facts. More precisely, it implies that if .
C. Tightness of the Bound in Main Theorem 3.1
Recently, in subsequent work to this paper, Paterson and Stinson [24] have shown that the bound in Main Theorem 3.1 is tight in some cases. Namely in each of the cases and they construct a family of secret sharing schemes for an infinite number of different values of , where the secret and each individual share are uniformly distributed in an alphabet of symbols, the privacy threshold is and the reconstruction threshold is . It is not presently known whether the bounds can be tight for (except in the trivial case ).
IV. BOUNDS INVOLVING THE SECRET-SPACE
If the cardinality of the secret-space is "large," then there is the following connection with the theory of error correcting codes. . Note that no two words can be the same, since by Lemma 3.8 the distance between words in different sets , is at least 1. Hence . Moreover, Lemma 3.8 also implies that the distance between any two different words of is at least which in turn is at least , therefore proving the claim about the minimal distance. We can also proof the result if is the empty set. In this case, we do not shorten but we construct directly from instead of . In the case of a linear scheme, we proceed the same way except that when constructing , in order to guarantee that it is a linear code, we first fix some basis of , and for each element in that basis, select one word . The selected words span a linear code over , and from this point on the proof continues in exactly the same way.
As an immediate consequence, restrictions on the parameters are obtained from known bounds on error correcting codes. For example, by combining Theorem 4.1 and the Singleton bound (see e.g., [25] ), we would get the well-known bound from [6] , [16] , [23] . However, a much stronger result is obtained from a suitable application of the Griesmer bound. This leads to a simple bound that is easy to compare with our first bound. The drawback, however, is that the Griesmer bound only applies to linear codes and consequently we will be restricted to linear secret sharing schemes.
Let denote the smallest integer that is larger than or equal to the real number . The Griesmer bound [15] However, for , only our first bound gives a nontrivial result.
V. ARITHMETIC SECRET SHARING
In [9] , the notion of arithmetic secret sharing was introduced. This generalizes previous notions, such as the strongly multiplicative secret sharing schemes defined in [12] . is in fact an -code for and 4)
. An -arithmetic secret sharing scheme for over is a LSSS over with secret in where there is -privacy and, in addition there is -fold product -reconstruction, i.e., for any set of players, the product of secrets can be reconstructed by applying some linear function to the vector of elements consisting of the products of the corresponding shares held by each of the players in the set. For the rest of the chapter, we will consider the case where , , known as strongly multiplicative secret sharing scheme (see [12] ). In addition we will restrict to the case , for which a notion that measures the largest possible value of with respect to asymptotically was defined in [8] , where it was named asymptotical optimal corruption tolerance. We recall its definition next.
Definition 5.7: Let be an -code for over . We define to be the maximum value of for which is an -arithmetic secret sharing scheme for (and if not such exists).
Moreover, we define . In addition, let And we define the asymptotical optimal corruption tolerance over .
Remark 5.8: We have . In [8] , it was proved that for every finite field . Previously, in [10] , it had been proved that for any square, . Now Corollary 5.6 implies Main Theorem 5.9: for all finite fields . Therefore, for all finite fields . In the remaining of this section, we will provide better bounds for . In the next two theorems, let be such that and are -codes for . We will use two different ideas: on the one hand we will apply the gap bounds in main Theorem 3.26 to both and . On the other hand, we will actually apply the bounds after shortening these codes. 
Proof:
We begin by proving the case . We first claim that This will imply that at least bits must be dealt (which is tight for a perfect power of 2). Since no single player is allowed to receive any information about a shared bit, the induced distributions on the conditioned variables and must be identical for all . By a simple convexity argument, 6 Furthermore, for , , it is impossible for both and . If this were the case, then in some circumstances it would be impossible to reconstruct the shared bit from the shares . Thus, Since any probability is at most 1, our claim is established. Now consider the general case where . We can convert any such secret sharing scheme to a threshold scheme for players and with . Let be a set of indices and . Let be a sequence of shares that could be dealt to (since people know nothing, this sequence of shares must be valid for both 0 and 1.) To share a single bit among , use the scheme to generate , conditioned on for . The shares of are . The values of are "hardwired" into the secret sharing scheme, and thus do not need to be transmitted. We thus have, By a simple convexity argument, we have that By renumbering the players, we can ensure that if and , then
. This gives us a final lower bound of bits that must be shared among the players.
We note that, even though this theorem is stated for the case where a bit is shared, it can be trivially extended to the case where the secret space is larger. The case of our Main Theorem 3.1 could be read as and hence is slightly more general than Theorem 3.2 in the sense that for all , but equality does not need to hold.
